The purpose of occupational pension funds is to safeguard long-term standard of living of the insured benefits through individual savings. This basic principle of the second pillar is increasingly threatened by the interests of the private sector. Given the social security system, policyholders are hardly able to defend their interests directly. And ‘then permitted the question of who can expect support and who not?
All initiatives, amendments to laws or actions of the legislature in recent years have always resulted in a reduction of the rights of policyholders. What seems to them not to worry. Otherwise how can the recent initiative to reduce the conversion has caused only minimal reactions by stakeholders? It would appear that they are overly stressed by a Party to the lack of information and the other for the failure of reaction. Those who are not professionally involved in occupational pension plans in danger of getting lost or confused in the terminology and not being able to join the discussion on minimum rates, conversion rate, or the legal quota rate technician. At the risk of losing sight of the main theme, namely “the money saved for when I retire.”
Whether it’s funny money, ie money that will be available only in a more or less distant future, according to the individual insured, makes the issue even more complex. The very fact that today most of the decisions on retirement assets are taken by government and politics, makes sure that many feel powerless, completely giving up any personal commitment. No doubt today the various actors within the second pillar can far better to impose their own interests than the one true user of the system, or insured persons. It must therefore question: Who actually protect the interests of policyholders?
The main purpose of the insured: a process of optimum saving
The second pillar is based on the structure of the individual process of saving during the active phase so as to result, at retirement, a retirement possibly higher. The resulting mandate for pension funds is therefore to invest the funds under management so that the long period is the highest returns. Discussions around the dispersions, the excessive costs and fees for consultancy show how the execution of this mandate, there is a wide margin. The question that arises is: what policyholders can expect from the various players in the system? The situation is as follows:
• The pension fund must invest so that the long period is the best performance possible. Given the recent financial market crisis that seems very difficult but, unlike for example insurance, employee benefits is oriented to the long period and is, in reality, little compared to events that can happen immediately. Many of its parameters, such as the increase in life ol’inflazione can not be changed. Through the pursuit of the objective, namely to achieve optimal results savings, pension funds should focus on factors that are influenced directly. They should then investrire especially as property values and actions. After defining the investment strategy it must be maintained consistently during both good years and in those most difficult. A look at the past shows that this strategy has allowed to realize the most value added and there is no real reason according to which the future must be different. The advantage of the obligatory lies in their power to stabilize fluctuations in value. The returns they can achieve in the long run will always be lower than equities. Continuous adaptation of the investment strategy so unstable parameters such as degree of coverage, the cycle of grants or even to comment on the investments of the Sunday press are misleading and do not correspond in any way the interests of policyholders.
• The consultants of social security institutions often influence the investment strategy. They are absolutely not interested in strong changes in shareholders because they are more responsible. They therefore tend, in principle, to recommend an investment strategy that allows to realize a minimum return of assets with minimum fluctuations. In the interest of the insured would, however, to maximize returns.
• Regulators (legislative, supervisory and other authorities) do not operate in favor of policyholders. The gradual imperceptible reduction in the second pillar in recent years is a direct result due to excessive regulation and the frustration of the earnings potential imposed by the state. The regulation requires pension funds more and more tasks unrelated to security and sets certain parameters limiting and counterproductive. Employee benefits requires a long-term vision. The evaluation according to the principles of liquids in particular for partial settlement is opposed to this principle.
• Under the policy catches the eye intense lobbying carried out by insurance companies, foreign as the systemic aspect to the Occupational and clearly pursues their interests above the shareholders. You can not infer from perceptions that their influence on the process of taking public opinion is even more important than for example the farmers’ associations or the pharmaceutical lobby.
• From the unions might be expected that a policy meets the interests of policyholders. They, like other representatives of the left have trouble with pension funds as an emanation of capitalism. Redistributing the style AHV paying them better than a process of individual savings.
• The collective foundations of large insurance companies offer their policyholders, as a rule, only a minimum interest rate, while any profits from interests converge directly into the pockets of their shareholders. The interests of individual members of boards of trustees and consultants are only very rarely to the interests of insured persons.
• Foundations collective autonomous or semi-autonomous or corporate pension funds are independent and not have to pay profits to third parties. This way they can plan long term and often are able to pursue strategies with greater investment risks. Comparisons have shown that in past collective independent foundations, as a rule, have offered a better return on retirement assets. Corporate pension funds, based on their economic mandate are often more prone to risk, not least because the employer is more involved with the management. Again history shows that the employer meets its responsibilities in case of difficulty of the pension fund.
Today are as independent collective foundations and corporate pension funds to protect the best interests of policyholders. They show responsibility towards them and allow policyholders to participate directly in any profits. It would be desirable, especially in defense of the insured, they will join more for better lobbying.




























































